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RECENT CASE NOTES
CHARACTER EvmENcF--Limited to traits involved in the charge, when
character is not impeached-Burns' Sec. 2272, 1926 inapplicable when
credibility is not attacked. Ernest Keener was convicted of operating a
automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Appeal for
error in refusing admission of certain evidence. At trial appellant testi-
fied he was not intoxicated at the time charged. State introduced wit-
nesses who testified he was intoxicated at that time. State did not impeach
appellant or attack his credibility. Appellant introduced evidence of his
general reputation for sobriety, and then offered evidence of his general
reputation for morality. This was rejected, and this is assigned as error.
HELD: When accused is neither impeached nor his credibility attacked,
evidence of character not pertaining to traits involved in the offense charged
is inadmissible, and no error was committed in excluding it. Keener v.
State, Appellate Court of Ind., Aug. 30, 1929, 167 N. E. 549.
It is generally admitted that accused may show good character in all
criminal issues, and from such generality of admission, certain well defined
rules govern the admission of such evidence. Proof of character is not a
substantive defence, but a circumstance to be considered along with other
evidence. Wharton Crim. Evid. Sec. 57, 58a. When introduced by accused
(unimpeached) it limited to traits involved in the issue. State v. Bloom,
68 Ind. 54, Kahlenbeck v. State, 119 Ind. 118, Walker v. State, 102 Ind.
502, Kee v. State, 28 Ark. 155, State v. Dalton, 27 Mo. 12, People V. Joseph,
7 Cal. 129, Wigmore Crim. Evid. Sec. 59, Wharton Crim. Evid. Sec. 59, p.
241.
The criminal statute in regard to admission of character evidence
(Burns' Sec. 2272, 1926) is not applicable to support the contention of the
appellant, and did not change the rule announced in State v. Bloom, supra.
The law presumes good character until it is attacked. Walker v. State,
supra. Since the character of appellant was not impeached nor his credibil-
ity attacked, it is incompetent to support him by evidence of general moral
character. Johnson v. State, 21 Ind. 329. Mere contradiction among wit-
nesses examined in court supplies no grounds for admitting evidence of
general character. 1 Greenleaf Evid. Sec. 469. Since evidence of accused's
character has probative value only for purpose of showing that accused
would not likely commit the offense charged, any traits not involved in
the charge would have no value where accused is unimpeached. If it were
admitted, in face of the presumption of good character which the State
did not attack, and in spite of the lack of probative value, the State would
have the right to attack in its broad extent. The law does not contemplate
the raising of irrelevant issues such as that. H. N. F.
CRIMINAL LAW-ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EvIDENCE-TIMELY OBJECTION-
Defendants were prosecuted for the possession and sale of intoxicating
liquor and maintaining a nuisance in violation of Prohibition Law (Acts
1925, p. 145, 154 c48). They were present when a keg of whiskey was
seized on their premises under a defective search warrant but made no
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move to suppress the evidence before the trial, nor until one witness had
testified without objection. 'HELD: Conviction affirmed. The court will
not permit an inquiry into a collateral issue as to the source of competent
evidence after the trial has started on its merits. Hantz v. State, App. Ct.
of Ind., May 8, 1929, 166 N. E. 439.
An objection to admissibility of evidence must be timely made. 1 Wig-
more on Evidence, Sec. 16(a). Weight of authority as well as reason
limits the inquiry of competency to proper testimony, and the courts do
not stop to inquire as to the means by which the evidence was obtained.
Adams v. N. Y., 192 U. S. 585, reaffirmed in Cogen v. U. S., 49 Sup. Ct.,
118 decided January 2, 1929.
Practically every state follows the rule laid down in Adams v. N. Y.,
supra, and the one recognized in Hantz v. State, supra. Only Kentucky
holds that evidence obtained by search warrant may be challenged after
the trial has started on its merits.
This case is interesting in that the Supreme Court of Indiana has never
as yet given a decision as to what is a timely petition for return of property
taken under a defective search warrant, or to suppress evidence and the ef-
fect of an untimely objection. The Appellate Court, however, since adopting
the rule in Hantz v. State in May, 1929 has followed the rule in the follow-
ing cases decided by it since that time: Breece v. State, 166 N. E. 620,
Goebel v. State and Arnold v. State, 166 N. E. 446, Boston v. State, 166 N.
E. 448, Eichoff v. State, 166 N. E. 445, Foster v. State, 166 N. E. 447, Mc-
Swain v. State, 167 N. E. 568, Thompson v. State and Thinnee v. State,
167 N. E. 345. These cases are reported in 88 Ind. App. -.
The rule laid down seems to assist in the administration of justice, is
clearly the weight of authority, and will likely be adopted by our Supreme
Court if squarely confronted with the question. T. H. F.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-CONTRACTS---BANRUPTCY AS ANTICIPATORY
Bn.cH-On Jan. 5, 1927, a contract was entered into between Robert M.
Catts and the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Exchange, parties of the first
part, and Melian Pavia, claimant, party of the second part, whereby the
latter agreed to pay the former $10,600,000 for the sale of certain lease-
hold premises to be acquired by the former; $125,000 on account of the
purchase price was paid by claimant. On Feb. 3, 1927 Catts and the
Merchants' and Manufacturers' Exchange was adjudicated bankrupts and
trustees were appointed for their estates. On August 2, 1927, Pavia filed
with the referee in bankruptcy proofs of claims against the trustees of the
respective estates, setting forth the above contract, the payment of the
$125,000, the failure of the bankrupts to acquire title to the property and
convey it to claimant, and the election of claimant to rescind the agree-
ment and recover the $125,000 with interest. The referee allowed the claim,
and the matter comes before this court on a petition to review the referee's
order HELD: Order of the referee affirmed. In re Catts. In re Mer-
chants' and Manufacturers' Exchange of New York, Claim of Pavia. Dist.
Ct. S. D., N. Y., June 25, 1929, 33 Fed. (2d) 963.
There being no existing res in the bankrupts' possession when the agree-
ment was made, this was an executory contract which bound them to
acquire the land in the future and transfer it to claimant. Cincinnati, etc.
